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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE KESLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID o. KESLER, Trustee 
of the Estate of Alice 
Kesler; DAVID o. KESLER, 
an individual, and HELEN 
KESLER, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 15520 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
In this matter David Kesler, Defendant-Respondent, 
son of Alice Kesler, Plaintiff-Appellant, seeks a judgment 
from the above-entitled Court sustaining the trial court's 
holding that a document marked Exhibit No. P-3, entitled 
"Warranty Deed," is a valid gift to Respondent from 
Appellant and should not be declared invalid. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court held for Defendant-Respondent 
on all points. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 14, 1971, the Appellant, Alice Kesler, 
widow of Otto Kesler, executed an instrument creating a 
revocable inter vivos trust of certain property to bene-
fit herself and members of her family and by quit claim 
deed conveyed the trust realty to her son, David O. 
----------------------------------- ------ -- -
Kesler, as trustee. The trust res consisted of real 
·"------- --------- - -----
and personal property located in Beaver and Millard 
,---------------- -- -~ -~- - ___,_. ~ 
Counties, including four (4) parcels of realty situated:' 
,.__ .. ~ -=---=~-- ----
in the F_Ul!llore City Survey. flt did not include 640 ~-acre~ ~~-n-v~ed_b:,_ Re;;~~ts1 in the Warranty Deed in J 
~question. /-
On____Septelt\}:)~___lO, 1971, at the request of Mrs. 
-J 
Alice Kesler, Eldon Eliason, Esq., drafted a Statement 
of Withdrawal pursuant to the provisions of the revocable 
trust whereby Mrs. Kesler requested that the four (4) 
1 ,, -~- ----------------~----------------­Fillmore parcels be-withdrawn from her trusJ:) Mrs. 
r -----------------------~----~ 
Kesler signed the Statement of Withdrawal, which was duly 
1
contrary to the assertion in Appellant's brief, 
the Statement of Withdrawal did not include the 640 acres 
in question in this action. 
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ty cl~ ,&_)[_,~.£-, 
,J i) c--;,---- -1 
-3-
notarized by Mr. Eliason in his Delta office. In accord dJ'--"~-1._k;__ < 
' ' t >!L, 
with the settler's request, the trustee, David o. Kesler, -rt-£>_ ~0iJ(-
the same day by quit claim deed reconveyed the four (4) 
------ - - - - ----- -- ------------------------
parcels to his mother. 
~ - - ---------------
On October 5, 1971, Mrs. Kesler wrote her son, 
---------------David, who by then had returned to his home in Montana. 
She expressed her desire that "all my Fillmore property 
(be) taken out of my trust," apparently not recalling her () 
I ' 
previous formal request to that effect. One week later 
she again wrote her son: "Dave, was I to write to 
Eliason and ask for my Fillmore property to be released 
from that trust or did you see to that when you were 
here." 
On J~~n an instrument acknowledged 
by the Millard County Clerk, Mrs. Kesler amended and modi-
fied her trust with regard to distribution of the trust 
property upon her death. Also that same day, Mrs. Kesler 
requested the recordation of the September 20, 1971, deed 
~self from David as her trus~ On July 14, 1972, 
Mrs. Kesler executed a Last Will and Testament which was 
attested to by Dr. Dean C. Evans and Scott A. Speakman, 
both Fillmore residents. David O. Kesler was named as 
\ ,,!' , L,/ 
) 
{} i-
, (/Vl'~ /}t~ ~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
executor and residuary legatee of the Will and remained the 
residuary distributee of the amended trust. In both her 
Will and the trust amendments, Mrs. Kesler limited the 
possible devise to two other sons, Joseph F. Kesler and 
Calvin T. Kesler, to $100.00 each under each distribution 
as she was then involved· in a dispute with these two sons 
over possession of certain other realty located near Cove 
Fort, Utah. In August of 1972, this dispute between Mrs. 
Kesler and her sons, Joe and Calvin, was brought to this 
Court for resolution in an action filed by Mrs. Kesler and 
David in his capacity as trustee. 
In February or early March of 1973, Mrs. Kesler, 
desiring that Joe and Calvin be unable to "get their hands 
on her property" and that David be compensated for helping 
and sustaining her, requested that her counsel, Mr. Eliason, 
draft a warranty deed conveying to David part of her 
interest in the Fillmore parcels and an additional section 
of realty west of Cove Fort. Mr. Eliason, seeing a potential 
conflict of interest, declined Mrs. Kesler's request and 
advised her to secure independent legal advice. He did not 
recommend any particular attorney. On March 9, 1973, David, 
at his mother's request, drove Mrs. Kesler to Salt Lake City 
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to the office of Mr. Fred Finlinson, Sr., Esq. Mrs. Kesler 
had previously become acquainted with Mr. Finlinson when he 
was present at an accounting made by Mr. Ellsworth Brunson 
in her action against Joe and Calvin. 
Mrs. Kesler asked Mr. Finlinson to draft a deed 
conveying the property in question to herself and David as 
joint tenants. 2 Finlinson thoroughly explained to her the 
effect of joint tenancies and then drafted the requested 
warranty deed, which Mrs. Kesler signed and Mr. Finlinson 
notarized. David recorded the deed three (3) days later. 
This property included no trust property whatsoever. Six 
hundred and forty acres had never been in the trust res and the 
remainder, the Fillmore property, had been withdrawn from 
the trust res a year and a half previously. 
At the taking of his deposition and at trial, 
David testified that his mother had intended to convey 
~
to him an undivided present interest in the property as 
I.. 
a gift for several reasons . 
. .--..--.........__ 
----------------------- -
These reasons, among others, 
were (1) for assistance in the lawsuit against Joe and 
Calvin, (2) to prevent Joe or Calvin from obtaining the 
2Mr. Finlinson testified at trial that Mrs. Kesler 
originally only wanted a deed from herself to David but that 
it was on his advice that the instrument was made in joint 
tenancy. 
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property, and (3) out of natural love and affection of 
a mother for her son, especially since David and his 
wife, Helen, had not "had things as easy" as Mrs. Kesler's 
other descendants. 3 In addition, David testified that he 
immediately recorded the deed in question at his mother's 
specific request because "(s)he was worried that some-
thing would happen". He also testified that his mother 
was familiar with the operation of joint tenancies and that 
this form of property ownership was chosen so that David 
would be sole owner at Mrs. Kesler's death, and that both 
the Fillmore property and the other 640 acres were dis-
cussed between them and mutually intended by them to be 
the gift. David further testified that he had no desire 
to challenge his mother's present possession of and income 
from the properties in question; rather, his testimony 
was to the effect that he was in this action merely 
defending his right of survivorship in the properties. 
At trial, Mr. Finlinson testified that he had 
advised Mrs. Kesler with respect to joint tenancies and 
3
rn a letter to "Dave, Helen and baby" dated 
October 12, 1973, Mrs. Kesler wrote: "We went to all that 
expense of building the museum (at Cove Fort) and Mary and 
LeGrande and the boys and their wives got the whole benefit. 
Never have you had a break with the others but earned it the 
hard way. Helen too as your father and I did." 
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that he had notarized the deed in question which Mrs. Kesler 
executed in his presence. Mr. Eliason testified that he 
prepared the Statement of Withdrawal from the trust and 
the September 20, 1971, quit claim deed in accordance with 
Mrs. Kesler's instructions and that the documents were 
executed before him at his office in Delta. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Kesler testified, at 
the taking of her deposition and at trial, that she had 
never been in Mr. Eliason's office, that she had signed 
nothing in Mr. Finlinson's office, that she was familiar 
with the operation of joint tenancies, that she intended 
that David have her Fillmore property at her death, and 
that she regarded her memory as good. She also testified 
that she signed what she thought was a Will which was to 
be recorded only at her death. 4 
The trial court held for David Kesler on all 
points, including the character of the instrument (a 
warranty deed in joint tenancy) and that it had been 
validly executed and delivered as a gift to David. 
4Evidently, Mrs. Kesler was familiar with the 
highly questionable Utah practice of a "deadman's deed", 
whereby a granter delivers a deed to the grantee but 
requests that it not be recorded until the grantor's 
death. As a method of avoiding probate and inheritance 
taxes, such a practice is clearly against public policy 
and should not be encouraged. 
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ARGUMENT 
It is elementary that a case on appeal to the 
Supreme Court is decided on issues of law. The trial 
court, in the present case, after considering all the 
evidence presented, has determined the facts, applied the 
applicable law, and has clearly held on every point for 
Respondent. 
Appellant has failed to carry her burden in 
proving the points below in the trial court. On appeal, 
Appellant has several additional burdens to overcome. 
First, she must establish that the District Court erred 
in its characterization of the instrument in question 
as a deed and not as a will, even though the trial court 
found the deed to be a valid warranty deed, clearly labeled 
as such, signed as such by Appellant, and correctly 
delivered to and recorded by Respondent. In addition, 
Appellan~, in Point II through VIII of her Appellant 
brief, merely repeats the same line of muddled inference, 
clearly distinguishable case support, misplaced burdens, 
and attempts at emotional manipulation which it placed 
before the trial court. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ESTABLISHED 
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FAILED TO 
CARRY THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ATTACKING 
THE JOINT TENANCY DEED IN QUESTION AS 
A WILL AND NOT A DEED. 
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It is well-established law, in Utah and else-
where, that a joint tenancy deed is to be taken at face value, 
and not otherwise, unless contested by another party, who 
then has a heavy burden of proof to show that the deed does 
not mean what it says it means: 
[It is a] universally accepted princi-
ple that joint tenancy documents, be they 
bonds, bank or savings accounts, deeds, 
negotiable instruments or the like, mean 
what they say, and are invulnerable to 
any other meaning until attacked by 
someone. The latter (the attacking 
party) . . . carries the burden of 
proving otherwise. Such proof must be 
by clear and convincing evidence. Spader 
v. Newbold, 29 Utah 2d 433. 
See also Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 
28 (1972); Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 17, 
439 P. 2d 468 (1968). 
Appellants not only failed to prove that the 
warranty deed was not a deed, but also failed to prove 
that the warranty deed was a will which failed. The intent 
of Appellant in executing the deed to Respondent has been 
clearly established by the trier of fact as being to execute 
and deliver a warranty deed. 
Appellant maintains that the intent of grantor 
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was not to pass a present interest, but rather an interest, 
which somehow vested after grantor's death. Appellant 
failed to point out, however, that 
[t]he controlling intent is that which is 
expressed in the instrument, rather than 
any belief or secret intention of the 
party or parties which may have existed 
at the time of execution. It has been 
pointed out, however, that the rule and 
the intention of the maker governs in 
determining the nature of such instruments 
is to be invoked only when the recitals 
of the instrument are obscure, equivocal 
and uncertain. 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds §177, 
at 222-23 (1965) (Emphasis ad~ 
See also Thom v. Thom, 171 Kan. 651, 237 P.2d 250 (1951) 
(in construction of deeds the intention of granter as 
gathered from an examination of the instrument in its 
entirety is controlling"). Appellant's reliance on 
First Security Bank v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P.2d 
297 (1952), is misplaced here. The issue in Burgi was 
whether the deed had been effectively delivered to the 
grantee. Evidence in Burgi was conflicting since the 
deed remained in grantor's valut until his death, so 
evidence re intent was considered. In the present case 
there is no question of delivery of the deed physically 
to grantee. And even where the instrument on its face 
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is equivocal--certainly not the case at bar--the fraud 
of modern decisions has been to uphold the instrument as 
a deed and not as a testamentary instrument. 
The deed here is not obscure, equivocal, or 
uncertain as to the time of its operative effect. It 
clearly states "WARRANTY DEED" on the top, and was signed 
as such, before witnesses, by Appellant. 
The only other possible explanation of Respondent's 
intent was that she executed and delivered a so-called 
"deadman's deed." A "deadman's deed" is a deed delivered 
to grantee by grantor, with the request that grantee not 
record the deed until grantor's death. Such "deeds" are 
a method of avoiding inheritance taxes and probate, and 
are clearly against public policy in Utah. The trial court 
wisely and correctly rejected the possibility that 
Appellant's deed to Respondent was a "deadman's deed." 
The court chose to judge the deed for what it is and should 
be--an instrument conveying as a gift a present interest 
in real property to Respondent. 
Property ownership in joint tenancy is a legiti-
mate will substitute and generally an effective probate-
avoidance device. Appellant's actions and expressed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
desires are totally consistent with joint tenancy owner-
ship. As the joint owner in possession, it is only 
natural that she would collect income from the property, 
pay the taxes, and generally manage the property. 
Appellant as possessory co-owner, in deed, may even be 
liable to Respondent had she failed to pay taxes or 
preserve the property. 
Furthermore, joint tenancy ownership is con-
sistent with Appellant's proven wish that the Respondent 
have the property at her (Appellant's) death. In the 
event Appellant predeceased Respondent, then by operation 
of law Respondent becomes sole owner of the property in 
fee simple. 
Finally, it is clear that had Appellant intended 
this document to be a will she knew how to execute one. 
She had executed a will in July, 1972, in which the formali-
ties were met and in which she provided for her testamentary 
disposition of property. 
In short, it is clear that the deed in question 
is a warranty deed, as the trial court found. A warranty 
deed is not a will, and it is not a "deadman's deed." It is 
exactly what the four corners and surrounding evidence as 
proved say it is--a presently operative deed in joint 
tenancy. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTCORRECI'LY DETERMINED THAT 
THE JOINT TENANCY WARRANTY DEED WAS NOT 
INVALID FOR ALLEGED INEFFECTIVE DELIVERY. 
The general rule, cited by Appellant, is that 
"a deed does not become effective until it is delivered." 
Gilbert v. Mcspadden, 91 S.W.2d 889, 899-90 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1936). Exactly what constitutes an effective delivery varies 
according to the fact situation. Certainly intent of the 
granter to deliver a present interest of real property to 
the grantee is a required element. Appellant's confusion 
in the case at hand centers around that nebulous and evasive 
area of "what really was the grantor's intent." As established 
in Point I, supra, Appellant failed to meet the burden of 
proof requirements establishing that Appellant's intent 
was something other than that clearly evident from the 
"four corners" of the warranty deed in question. 
The warranty deed instrument was clearly signed by 
the granter, and was in the possession of the Respondent. 
The presumption can only be, in this case, that the granter 
tendered possession of the deed to grantee with intent of 
vesting in the grantee title to the property described in 
the deed: 
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(a) presumption of delivery of a deed 
arises from its possession by the grantee 
or one claiming under him. In other words, 
possession of a deed of property by the 
grantee therein named . . . is prima 
facie evidence of its delivery, and of 
the grantor's intent then to vest 
in the grantee title to the property 
therein described. 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds 
§llS, at 163-64 (1965). 
Presumption of a validly delivered deed is also 
raised upon recordation of the deed: 
It is generally held by nearly all the 
authorities on the subject that the recording 
of a regularly executed and acknowleged deed 
by either the granter or the grantee raises 
a rebuttable or disputable presumption 
of delivery. In other words, a prima facie 
case is made by such showing. Id. §120, 
at 168-69. 
This heavy burden on the Appellant-granter is 
well-established in Utah: 
A deed duly executed and acknowleged and 
shown to be in the possession of the 
grantee is self-proving both as to 
execution and delivery, and that the 
recording of a deed is likewise evidence 
of delivery ... And not only is the 
burden of proving nondelivery upon the 
plaintiffs, but the inference of delivery 
arising from possession of the deed by 
the grantee and from the recording thereof 
is entitled to great and controlling 
weight and can only be overcome by clear 
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and convincing evidence. Chamberlain v. 
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 434, 436, 29 P.2d 
355, 361, 362 (1934). 
Later Utah cases are equally clear. See Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 
(1966) (deed from father through stawman to himself and 
four children as joint tenants upheld); Allen v. Allen, 115 
Utah 303, 204 P.2d 458 (1949). 
In the present case, Appellant conceded even at the 
trail court, that physical custody of the deed passed from 
the grantor to grantee, that the grantee retained irrevo-
cable possession of the deed, and that the deed was properly 
recorded. The inference of delivery was rightfully entitled 
to great weight at trial court. The trial court correctly 
found that Appellant failed to overcome this inference by 
"clear and convincing evidence." Appellant also failed to 
prove nondelivery by any positive evidence whatsoever. 
Appellant's attempts, once again, to overcome the 
presumption of valid delivery by claiming lack of "intent" 
by granter to convey a present interest to the grantee. 
However, Appellant's assertions are without merit in four 
ways. 
First, Appellant cites no Utah cases to support 
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her assertion that grantor's intent to make a present trans-
fer is even necessary to establish when there is an actual 
transfer of the instrument to grantee. It appears that 
all Utah cases where grantor's intent was an issue with 
respect to delivery (and hence validity) of a deed involved 
fact situations where there was no transfer of custody of 
the deed to the grantee. See Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 
228 P. 911 (1924) (deed found in grantor's possession at 
death); Reed v. Knudson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P.2d 347 (1932) 
(evidence of intent important as to whether person to whom 
deed was delivered was agent of grantee or of granter); 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465 (1939) 
(conflicting testimony as to whether there had been a 
manual delivery); Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P.2d 
132 (1951) (evidence of intent showed irrevocable delivery 
of deeds by granter to third party). In the same vein, 
the cases cited by Appellant to support her assertion 
are distinguishable on their facts. In Gilbert v. Mcspadden, 
91 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), the deeds were found 
in the grantor's baggage (his grip!); at his death, in 
Martiney v. Archuleta, 64 N.M. 196, 326 P.2d 1082 (1958), 
the questioned deed was never in the possession of the 
grantees, and in Henneberry v. Henneberry, 330 P.2d 250 
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(1958), the court found that the mutual intent of the parties 
at the time of manual delivery was that document not take 
effect until the grantor's death. 
Second, assuming arguendo that under Utah law 
grantor's intent is a necessary element of effective 
delivery even when there is a transfer of the deed to the 
grantee's custody, Appellant still has failed to carry her 
burden of providing by clear and convincing evidence that 
her intention in executing the deed and delivering it to 
grantee was not to convey a present property interest. 
This the trial court clearly established, in accordance 
with Henneberry, supra, at 253: 
Fundamentally, the question of 
intent is one of fact to be determined 
by the trier of facts on all the evi-
dence. 
The trial court was able to consider the testimony of all 
witnesses, particularly the Appellant, and observe the 
demeanor, behavior, and inconsistencies during that 
testimony. 
In addition, it is clearly established in July 
of 1972, less than one year prior to the execution and 
delivery of this deed that Appellant executed a valid will in 
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which she left, among other things, the residue of her 
estate to Respondent. The will was not revoked or modi-
fied prior to execution and delivery of the deed in 
question. Clearly, the July 1972 will is where any 
testamentary gift or future interest would be provided 
for--including any residue. In making a present gift, 
as the trial court found, Appellant intended delivery to 
convey present title of a present interest. 
There is much other evidence which this Court 
may choose to review to support this point. The great 
preponderance of the evidence establishes, however, that 
Appellant did intend, at the time the deed was executed 
and delivered, to convey to Respondent a present interest 
in joint ownership of the property as joint tenants. 
POINT III 
DEED NOT INVALID FOR ALLEGED FRAUD, UNDUE 
INFLUENCE, OR MISTAKE. 
Appellant correctly asserts that a deed may be 
voided for fraud or undue influence of the grantee upon 
the granter. Since undue influence is often used 
synonymously with fraud or as a species of constructive 
fraud (~Annot., 28 A.L.R. 787 (1924); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 
790 (1935)), both subjects will be treated here. Because 
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of the common issues involved, mistake will also be consid-
ered under voidability of a deed. 
A. Failure to Prove Fraud. 
Appellant failed to prove* the nine basic elements 
of fraud, which are: 
It may be stated generally that the 
elements of actual fraud consist of: 
(1) A representation; (2) its falsity; 
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance 
of its truth; (5) his intent that it 
should be acted upon by the person and 
in the manner reasonably contemplated; 
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) his reliance upon its 
truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; 
(9) his consequent and proximate injury. 
Stuck v. Delta Land & Water, 63 Utah 495, 505, 227 P. 791, 
795 (1924), CITED IN Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. 
2d 1094 (1932); Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 
229 (1947); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 873 
(1952) . 
The general law is in harmony with Utah law with 
regard to the burden of proof resting on the one alleging 
*Furthermore, Appellant even failed to plead fraud (or 
mistake) with particularity, contrary to Rule 9(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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[t)he party who alleges fraud as the basis 
of a cause of action or defense has the 
burden of establishing it by the requisite 
of quantum of proof in order to prevail in 
this action. 37 Arn.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit 
§437, at 596 (1968). 
Appellant failed to prove these elements of trial court, 
where Respondent (by far) exceeded his burden in not only 
establishing the absence of fraud, but did so by introducing 
far more evidence than his small burden required to establish 
firmly and clearly the absence of fraud in this transaction. 
Finally, it should be pointed out here that at 
trial, Appellant herself took the rather confusing position 
by insisting, under oath, that she signed nothing in 
Attorney Finlinson's office, but that whatever she did 
sign was a will! This denial of signature was contradicted 
not only by Attorney Finlinson's seal and signature on the 
deed, but also contradicted Attorney Finlinson's testimony 
and Respondent's testimony as well. 
Another interesting question arises with regard 
to Respondent allegedly folding a yellow paper over the 
instrument to "trick" the mother he stood by and sacrificed 
for. Appellant claims she could not see the deed because 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-21-
of the paper. She also claims she cannot see at all, with-
out her glasses, and at trial took great pains to indicate 
this "problem" by taking several minutes to search for 
and put on glasses each time asked to read something. If 
she can·· t see, as counsel suggests, then she really did not 
miss anything even if the deed were "obscured." However, 
the trial court observed this little comedy and probably 
saw through it in finding for as well as holding for 
Respondents. 
Separate evidence clearly establishes, moreover, 
that the warranty deed in question was signed, witnesses, 
and notarized in Fred Finlinson's law office. What, then, 
was this "folded paper" with reference to? If it did 
indeed exist, it obviously did not obscure the deed in 
question. 
It would appear, in short, that any testimony which 
contradicts Appellant's somewhat jaundiced perception of the 
facts is to be denied any integrity and credibility whatso-
ever, if Appellant is to be believed. The trial court did 
not, of course, give credence to these irresponsible alle-
gations and inferences of fraud. 
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B. Failure to Prove Undue Influence. 
The burden on Appellant to prove undue influence 
is more than clear and convincing. The evidence must also 
be "cogent." See Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d 341, 325 
P.2d 839 (1958), CITED IN Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 50 Wash. 
2d 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1957). 
Once again, Appellant has failed in trial court 
to prove that burden. If anything, at trial the Appellant's 
very strong will and inability to be influenced by anyone 
were very evident to the trier of fact. 
Appellant appears uncertain, even evasive, in 
attempting to define undue influence. She cites two out-
of-state cases as well as American Jurisprudence in a vague 
and muddled way, without reference to the more commonly 
understood definitions which amount to substituting the 
will of one person for that of another. 
One court has held that undue influence 
[t]o vitiate a conveyance must destroy 
the grantor's free agency at the time the 
conveyance is executed and must, in effect, 
substitute the will of another for that of 
the granter ... [n]ot all influences will 
avoid a deed. Influences which arise out of 
the affection, confidence and gratitude of a 
parent to a child and inspire a gift are 
natural and lawful influences and will not 
render such a gift voidable. It is only 
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when influences have been such as to 
confuse the judgment and control the 
will of the granter that they become 
undue influences. Antle v. Hartman, 
193 Okla. 524,524, 525-26, 145 P.2d 
756, 756-57 (1944). (Emphasis added). 
Appellant maintained her free agency at all times 
in her dealings in question. The attempted appearance of 
Appellant as a befuddled old lady who can never quite find 
her glasses, and never really understands what's going on, 
was easily seen through in court. Appellant, if influenced 
at all, was found to be influenced by Respondents' thankless 
tasks in constantly interrupting his own life to look after 
his mother. That a gift of real property, in joint tenancy 
deed, was given to Respondent in gratitude is not surprising, 
but rather is a natural and lawful consequence of natural 
and lawful concern and anxiety of a son for his elderly 
mother. 
One court, in an amazingly similar fact situation 
as the case at bar, has broken down the elements of undue 
influence with secure specificity: 
It has been held that whatever may 
be the particular form of undue influence 
asserted in all cases, three factors are 
involved: 
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(1) A person who can be influenced. 
(2) The fact of improper influence 
exerted. 
(3) Submission to the overmastering 
effect of such unlawful conduct. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 85 N.W.2d 211, 221 
(N.D. 1957) tdeed of all grantor's farm 
lands to himself and one of his sons as 
joint tenants held valid). 
Early in trial proceedings, Appellant conceded 
she is competent. As the facts, testimony, and Appellant's 
demeanor and bearing developed at trial, it became obvious 
to all, including the fact finder, that Appellant is 
definitely not "a person who can be influenced." 
Likewise, the trial court held as a matter of 
fact that the "fact of improper influence exerted" simply 
was not present. 
Similarly, Point 3 of Johnson, supra, was found 
to be non-existent, since no unlawful conduct was estab-
lished, and in any event Appellant did not submit to the 
"overmastering effect" of "such unlawful conduct." 
Since neither fraud nor undue influence were 
established, nor can now be established, there is no 
reason to reverse the trial court and cancel a clear and 
valid warranty deed. 
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Appellant cites two lengthy citations from American 
Jurisprudence to suggest that undue influence is present due 
to a "confidential relationship" between mother and son. 
Appellant, however, assumes that a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship exists between Appellant and Respondent in the 
present case. While Appellant correctly asserts that a 
presumption of undue influence may exist in some cases where a 
proven confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between 
grantor and grantee as to the subject matter of the trans-
action in question. However, the burden of proving the existence 
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship remains on the 
grantor. See Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity, 330 Mo. 854, 
51 S.W.2d 30 (1932). The burden is evident: "Where the 
relationship does not exist as a matter of law, must be proved 
by clear and convincing evidence." Stone v. Stone, 407 Ill. 
66, 77, 94 N.E.2d 855, 861 (1950). Appellant asserted and 
failed to prove, in the trial court, that such a relationship 
existed between the parties in this action with respect to the 
property in question--namely, the property deeded to Respondent 
by the Appellant. 
Appellant attempted to prove that Respondent owed 
fiduciary duties to his mother in his capacity as trustee of 
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her revocable trust. It is axiomatic that a trustee's 
duties to a beneficiary do not extend to dealings in 
property not part of the trust res. See Bogert & Bogert, 
Handbook of the Law of Trusts, §96, at 352 (5th ed. 1973); 
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Gold, 217 Wis. 522, 259 
N.W. 260 (1935); Stone v. Stone, supra. In the present 
case, the property conveyed in the challenged deed was not 
part of the trust at the time the deed was executed. 
Appellant had withdrawn the Fillmore properties from the 
trust a year and a half previous to the execution of the 
deed in question, and the 640 acres of grazing ground near 
Cove Fort had never been included in the trust res. Thus 
Respondent owed Appellant no duties with regard to the 
property in question. Appellant's assertion to the contrary 
is as spurious and misplaced on appeal as it was when the 
trial court ruled against her. 
Furthermore, Appellant argues that the relation-
ship between her and her son is per se confidential merely 
because a parent-child relationship exists. Utah law clearly 
rejects the per se rule: 
[t]he mere relationship of parent and 
child does not constitute evidence of 
such confidential relationship as to 
l 
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create a presumption of fraud or undue 
influence. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, supra, 
citing Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83 Utah 271, 28 
p. 2d 135 (1934). 
~also Furlong v. Tilley, 51 Utah 617, 172 P. 676 (1918), 
Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 948 P. 433 (1914). 
Once again the burden of proof is on the Appellant--
in this case to prove the existence of a confidential rela-
tionship by clear and convincing evidence. Once, again the 
Appellant clearly failed to carry the burden of proof, both 
at trial court and in argument on appeal. 
For the sake of argument only, however, let us 
assume that a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
existed with respect to the property in question. Appellant 
must still show that undue influence in fact did exist. 
The grantee need not prove by "clear and convincing" 
evidence, but only "by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the transaction was fair." Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 
supra at 713 n. 4. This burden Respondent has shown at 
trial. 
Appellant ~ stipulation is mentally competent, 
a fact which distinguishes this case from those in which 
deeds have been cancelled because of undue influence. 
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See Parris v. Benedict, 28 Wash.2d 817, 184 P.2d 63 (1947) 
where the court noted that out of eleven previous cancella-
tion of deed cases involving claims of undue influence in 
Washington, in every case decreeing cancellation the court 
found the granter to be mentally incompetent or nearly so, 
Conversely, in every case where the challenged deed was uphelc, 
the granter was found clear of mind, or at least not mentally 
incompetent. In cases where gr an tors have less mental capacit 
than Appellant, who admittedly is fully competent, courts have 
refused to invalidate challenged conveyances. See, ~., 
Richmond v. Ballard, supra, (deed from 86-year old man to 
housekeeper upheld); Johnson v. Johnson, supra, (deed upheld 
from father to son and himself as joint tenants); Binder v. 
Binder, 50 Wash. 20, 142, 309 P.2d 1050 (1967) (deed from 
mother to son upheld}; Thomas v. Johnson, 183 Ore. 405, 193 
P.2d 534 (1948) (deed reserving a life estate from mother to 
adopted daughter upheld); O'Neill v. Dennis, 109 Cal. App. 
2d 210, 240 P.2d 376 (1952) (deed upheld from 80-year old 
woman to casual friend) • 
All this the trial court carefully considered and 
held for Respondent. With the even heavier burden on appeal 
to overcome, Appellant should not, as a matter of law, be 
permitted to prevent a valid gift of a warranty deed to be 
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invalidated. Appellant's emotional rhetoric, slander 
of all attorneys involved (except her own) for obvious 
reasons, and misplaced innvendo to the contrary. 
The Supreme Court of Utah should not for a moment 
be swayed by Appellant's attempts side-step the real issues 
by emotional advocacy. Appellant, as was obvious in trial 
court, is hardly the innocent, misguided person who sweetly 
and naively placed all trust and all her security in her 
dastardly son who, abetted by a battery of shifty, incompetent 
legal counsel, tricked her into signing a document with 
WARRANTY DEED spelled out clearly at the top, properly 
notarized, and duly recorded. 
C. Failure to Prove and Absence of Mistake. 
Appellant merely cites an irrelevant section of 
American Jurisprudence to argue mistake in this case. As 
with her other alleged defenses, the burden of proof here 
rests with Appellant. Appellant must prove the type of 
mistake of law or fact that warrants equitable cancella-
tion of the deed. See 54 Arn.Jur.2d Mistake, Accident, or 
Surprise, §26. 
At trial Appellant failed to prove either mutual 
or unilateral mistake, or the materiality thereof. Appellant 
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here does not even identify whether the "mistake" alleged 
was one of law or fact. Appellant cites no Utah or other 
primary authority to support her position, whatever that 
position may be. The trial court did not cancel the 
transaction in question, on grounds of mistake or for any 
other reason. It is not clear why or how "mistake" was an 
issue at trial, and it is even less clear why cancellation 
on grounds of mistake is truly at issue now, on appeal. 
A. Laches. 
POINT IV 
BALANCING OF EQUITIES 
Appellant, seeking an equitable remedy, is required 
to prosecute her claim in a reasonable time. This Appellant 
failed to do. Delay of two or three years in bringing the 
action, as is the case here, has been held sufficient for 
the doctrine of laches to apply. See Leeper v. Beltrami, 
53 Cal.2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, l Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959). And 
the general rule requires promptness. 
A suit for recission (cancellationl must be 
brought promptly after the plaintiff has knowledge of the 
facts constituting the grounds for recission. Certainly 
three years is not prompt. The Utah statute of limitations 
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is three years with respect to actions for fraud or mistake. 
Utah Code Ann., §78-12-36. Three years and one day have 
elapsed between the alleged fraud and the filing of the 
complaint. One day is sufficient to bar the claim by law. 
Appellant's unreasonable and unexplained delay is certainly 
a factor to be considered in balancing the equities. 
B. Burden of Proof. 
The burden is on the Appellant for what is essen-
tially a bill in equity. She has failed to show that this 
court's equitable jurisdiction is correctly invoked, ~fortiori 
with sufficient weight to tilt the balance of equities in her 
favor to merit cancellation. Even without Appellant's burden 
of proof, the balance of equities favors Respondents, 
especially so on appeal. 
C. Appellant's Emotional Appeals. 
Appellant•s emotional appeals fool no one, and are 
obviously irrelevant under the facts of this case. This is 
especially so with respect to the security of the elderly. 
Even if Appellant did not possess other private resources, 
she would be secure because Respondents have no intention of 
evicting Appellant or even of challenging Appellant's 
possession of or income from the property in question. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-32-
Respondents have no counterclaim praying for partition 
of the property and ejectment of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is well established that Appellant executed 
a deed and not a will. The deed was validly executed and 
delivered. Appellant's intent was clear, and was proved at 
trial. She was subject to no fraud, undue influence, or 
mistake. The property in question was not in the trust 
res she had established. There was no trustee-in-trust 
or implicit fiduciary duty of Respondent to Appellant 
under the facts given. Appellant delayed filing this 
action for an unreasonable time. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, and carefully weighed the facts and 
law. The decision for Respondents was on the merits, 
and was a proper decision. The trial court should be 
sustained on all points. 
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